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T~~. 13
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p AIR COMMANDd*oh840N5D '
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REPORTNUMBER84p135
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84-1355 A 0 -h N4. TITLE (an~d Subtitle) S. TYPE OF REPORT &PERIOD COVERED
GREAT WARRI OR: MOSHE DAYAN ___________
6. PERFORMING 01G. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) S. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
David M. Jacobs, Major, UJSAF
S. PEFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS 10. PROGRAM ELrMENT, PROJECT. T hSKAREA 6 WORK UNIT NUMBERS
ACSC/EDCC, MAXWELL AFB AL 36112
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90, ABSYRACY MM1A0laA # 6.0en Old# ID .a.t 0080W*4i drit,0 bl Wok #swabosJ
An aInalysis of the ilfitary strateqy of 'Major General Moshe Oayanin the contc~t of the ACSC strategy process model. Analysisfocuses u~pon Dayan's role and strategy. iii the four Arab-Israeliwars during the 1948-1973 period.
tin1473 F.01Yo. Or NOI ,6ov1 SOBSOLETE UN CASSI VI
*I 7 77~
___ ___ ___ ABOUT THE AUTHOR _ _ _ _ _ _ _
* Major Jacobs was commissioned in 1969 through the Reserveofficer Training Corps program. He has held a variety of
-,supervisory and comimand positions in aircraft maintenance atCONUS and overseas locations. Most recently, he vwas commander
*of the 3380th OmSq at Keesler AFB,* Ms. He has performed temporary
duty assignments in the Middle East. Major Jacobs has attendedSquadron Officer's School and Air Command and Staff College. He
holds a Master of Business Administration degree from the Univer-sity of Utah.
Accessionl ForNTIS GR-A&Z
-' ~D~itribution1/__
*Ava~ilability Codes3*Ava~il anid/or
Dist spocial
______ ______TABLEr OF CONTENTS _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Chapter One- Moshe Dayan-----------------------------------1
Chapter Two -War for Independence ------------------------- 4
Chapter Three The Suez Campaign 1956 --------------------- 9
Chapter Four- The Six Day War ----------------------------- 14
Chapter Five - Yom Kippur War ------------------------------ 18
Chapter Six - Moshe Dayan and the Strategy Process ----------26
Appendix -Key Events in Moshe Dayan's Life -----------------32
iv
LL
Chapter One
MOSHE DAYAN
*Moshe Dayan's childhood was marked by adversity. He was
born on May 14, 1915 in Deganiahp the first kibbutz in Palestine.
His parents were Ukranian Jews as were the twenty odd other mem-
bers of the farm settlement. These people, for the most part,
*were not farmers and endured considerable hardship working the
marshy land near the Sea of Gallilee. Illness was pervasive.
Dayan's father suffered from malaria; his mother, kidney ailments;
and young Dayan was plagued with chronic eye infections.
As a youth, Dayan had much exposure to the Arabs. He spoke
fluent Arabic. Despite the Arab marauding his kibbutz often
experienced, Dayan reported thatt
My own attitude to our Arab neighbors was always posi-7 ~tive and friendly. I like their way ef life and I
respected them~ as hard workers devoted to the landand to our comnion natural environmient. I 'had no doubt
tha itwasposible to live at peace with themn.
Dayan's attitude towards, and knowledge of the Arabs would
profoundly shape his later mili.tary and political life.
Dayans first ser ;us mili".-Zry expe: ience occurrod in 1937
duringi thi "Arab revalt", when hc became a guide -for the British
Mandat-ory goverinent police force.* His duties were to guide and
serve as a translator for a Scottish regimient assigned to protect-
:the Iraq Petroleum Company oil pipelinefoaArbabtr.I -% rontArabsaboeurs
7 7, 7 7 - 7 77-7=77 -7-
The British troops,, however, were not effective in halting
attacks on the pipeline. Dayan learned from this experience that
the only way to fight saboteurs "...was to seize the initiative,
attack them in their bases, and surprise them when they were on
the move,, (2:41).
During this period, Dayan met Captain Orde Wingate, who later
won acclaim as a general in Burma during WWII. Wingate taugh~t
Dayan his unorthodox methods of warfare which he had developed
earlier in Sudan. Specifically, Wingate emphasized night attacks
using terrain and cover to achieve surprise and initiative.
4 Dayan served under Wingate in a number of successful operations
against terrorist gangst and became an ardent admirer of Wingate.
Dayan's early experiences with the Arabs and the British
army set the stage for his impressive military and political
career. in the 1948 War for independence he commanded a highly
succossful commando battalion. Promoted to Major General, hie
became Israeli Chief of Staff in 1953. lie loft the military in
1957 to become Ministe r of Agriculture. Dayan was dramatically
recailled by public outcry in 1967 to become Minister of Defense
on tho eve of tho Six Day War. H ~e resigned his office after the
1973 Yom Kippur War in the face of public denunciation for heavy
Ilsaeli casualties. Dayan vas recalled, agains in 1977 to become
V'oreign Ministor and conduct peace negotiations with the E3gyp-
tians. lie rLosiqned this office In 1979 in protest over Israeli
plaits to impuse, Israol' sovreiglity mi tht.e lest Blank. Hie died in
Dayan vas a complex pertiondlity marked by conatradictions.
2
Though he-received little formal education, he authored a book
on the Old Testament and several others on Israeli military
campaigns and the Egyptian peace negotiations. Though a military
officer, he was a political liberal in his attitude towards social
issues in general and the Arabs, in particular. Though raised
in a strict religious environment, his brazen disregard for
. Israeli morality in pursuing women was a national scandal. In
short, he was a detached, aloof, unapproachable person who defies
comprehension.
3 ,'
• . ,' I..
Chapter Two
WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE
"How beautiful was this day, May 14y" an Arab Legion o1Z -(,r
said, "when the whole world held its breath anticipatitig thc.
entry of seven Arab armies into Palestine to redeem it from the
Zionists and the West" (5:315). So it was. At eight o'clock
that morning the British terminated their thirty year mandatory
rule over Palestine. By that afternoon the entire country was
at war as Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion proclaimed Israel's
independence.
Israel had no regular army to meet the-invading forces.
The country did# however, have a well organized underground force
of some 30,000 men. This ill-equipped force evolved in less than
a year to an organized army of nearly 100,000 (50339). The Is-
raeli's never did have superiority in aither numbers or equipment
*over the Arabs.* Their most important asset -was the "dedication
arid military experience of their troops.*,*. (50311).
In contrast, the Arab f orces consisted of 10g000 Egyptiansf
8.000 Iraqlis, 7.000 Syrians# 4v500 Arab Legionairesi,-and 3#500
Lebanose troops (5:318-.320". These forces were equipped with
ample weaponry to include tanks and aircraft.* These advantages'
were offset by tho dubious motivatiotk of the soldiers, and the
*lackluster leadership of the of ficers. The best of th-e groups
4
by far, were the British led Jordanian Arab Legionaires.
Another factor that hampered the Arab forces was their lack
of coordination. Though their announced objective was to
drive the Israelis out of Palestine, the leaders did
not trust each other and each was pursuing his territorial con-
quest. As a result, the Arabs were unable to consolidate their
gains and maintain the initiative. This was evident in even the
first engagement of the war, the Syrian invasion of Gallilee on
May 15th.
The Syrian force swept through the region with ease. They
had a force of 45 tanks and over two hundred armored vehicles
plus air support (5t319). The Syrians overran a large farm
settlement and proceeded to attack Deganiah-p Moshe Dayan's
birthplace. flayan assumed couimand and organized the kibbutz into
a defense force. Dayan dug trenches and prepared for the assault.
At dawn the next morning the Syrians' began artillery. shelling.
They then initiated their attack with-infantry and tanks. "Th
-~Syrians advanced according to the book, tanks flanked by infantry,
*Dayan reported (2091). * Xayana at that very moment, assembled an.
ancient field piece that had Just arrived f rom OVerseas. As the
lead tanks penetrated the kibbutZ :Perimeter, Dayan readied the
OU to fire, HO scored a direct hit on the lead tank. -The
Syrians, startled by the presence of artillerys fled in panic,
abandoninq their vehiclesp V04poMn rd conquered territory (50s19).
As Dayan then retraced thei path of the Syrian forces h
observed , Much younq blood had boen shed, the blood not of tr~aild
- and veteran wairriors, but of youw tetS rWeeting daai wide-.eyed. -
All knew . . .There could be no retreat and no surrender" (2:92).
The Syrian threat was thus neutralized. The advances of the
Egyptian army and Arab Legionaires were another matter. The
Egyptians had launched a two pronged attack across the Negev
Desert. One force advanced along the coastal road to Tel Aviv.
The other column headed for Jerusalem. Meanwhile, the Legion-
aires mounted a strong, determined siege on Jerusalem and poised
another force at Lydda, merely seven miles from Tel Aviv.
1Dayan was assigned the mission of loading a commando bat-
talion against two Legion strong points near Tel Aviv.* He struck
swiftly at these points in a frontal assault and withdrew leaving
* a small force behind to scuffle with the I.egionaires,. Dayan was
impatient. He wanted decisive action. He decided to attack the
main Legion force at the lvargeo well-fortified city of Lydda. To,
*attack this city frontally "held no chance of success" observe~d
.Dayan (2tIOG). However, an attack front the cast, the enemties
own resupply routeo would achieve surprise, and perhaps succuSSO
He led his column, of jeeps intn-the city from-t1Ie east and caught
the Legionaires unaware.
- 1arrelinqc through the main street at full speedo machinequns firings Daan's troops sent the Leioinesi t leiVith this Sledgehammer operation, the Jews eliminatedany retain-ing threat to the Tel Aviv arda (5031).
1 espito the Missios success, Dayan's superior, Major General
* Viqaol. Yadin.o wais not impressod. Dayan's action had been m~ore
or a Prank, thani a military Opekation. Iiayan reporteds
He did not agree with my implied thesis that the way to* gt past the first ine of. enemy positions was throaiqh
tie fast'and darin dash. To ji~m, an attack oldb-planned and carried out WOthodically. .(:1)
R71- -'7777-..'---.
Nevertheless, Yadin gave-Dayan another mission. H e was to
command one of three battalions in the final campaign of the war--
to drive the Egyptians from the Negev desert. This was the last
Arab force to remain on Israeli territory. Yigael Allon, the
senior Israeli commander in the Negev, wanted to attack the key
Egyptian stronghold there. However, only one road approached this
heavily fortified position and losses would be very heavy with
success doubtful in such a narrow frontal assault.
Allon learned from archeological maps that the Romans had
built a road approaching the fort from the opposite direction of
the existing road. They excavated likely sites in the desert and
found the road. Under the cover of darkneso, they advanced a
column up the roadbed and attacked the rear side of the fort.
The astonished Egyptians had their tanks deployed in the other
direction; and their artillery was aimed for an attack up the~r
existing road. With the advantages of surprise and initiative,
the Israelis prevailed. The Egyptians negotiated and later
signed an armistice agreement.
Meanwhile, Dayan's battalion had overrun the Egyptian posi-
tion at a nearby airfield in the manner he had used previously--
he broke through the front into their rear and they surrendered.
, This tactic cost Dayan dearly in losses this time though. He
and his force got trapped by a ravine and had to endure shelling
while they leveled the ravine walls with shovels to get across
(2a119).
Dayan exemplified the tactics and mode of operation that
, achieved victory for the Israelis in the War for Independence.
7
The disadvantages under which the Israeli Army oper-ated. . . its weakness in manpower, its lack of modernweapons and the necessity to fight on many fronts atthe same time--evolved a military philosophy basedon flexibility, the use of surprise and innovation
* Dayan employed, as did other Israeli commanders, night-attacks
to neutraliz% to a degree Arab advantages. Also, Israeli corm-
manders displayed a:
flexibility of thought that encouraged the leaderin battle to adapt himself to the vicissitudes of,.war at a moments notice and to take advantage ofchanging circ*mstances in the- field (3:107).
L .° <
i ..
4' "
-Y .777 777 77
Chapter Three
THE SUEZ CAMPAIGN 1956
In the spring of 1956, Gamel Abdul Nasser nationalized the
Suez Canal and created a world crisis. Prior to that he had
:closed the. Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping,~ Negotiations
*and diplomatic moves in the United Nations had continued through
-the summer and into October with no success. Nasser had ordered
-the UN peacekeeping'forces out of the Sinai and moved in his own,,
*He had also set about organizing the other Arab countries to
join in a war with Israel to regain their honor lost by their
defeat in 1948 (5:488).
I * Major General 'Moshe Dayans now Israeli Chief of Staff, was
• . ,., ---
deeply concerned by Nasser's threatening actions. Nasser had
openly supported terrorist raids from bases in the Gaza Strip
(1:1!7). His closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping
was in, violation of the 1948 armistice and was seriously impacting
on Israeli trade, Dayan advocated preemptive military action to
resolve the issues (21183). However# he and other leaders recog-
nizod that preemptive military action on Israel's part would be
* disastrous politically until all diplomatic efforts had taken
their course.
Throughout this period, the British and French governments
wore alarmed by Nasser's control of the canal and his overtures
. ... . .9
towards the Soviets. They could, however, for political reasons
do little more than attempt to negotiate with Nasser.
It was against this backdrop that on Oct 22, 1956, Dayan
secretly visited France to propose a plan for joint military
action (5:451). Dayan's plan was for Israel to stage a military
action in the vicinity of the Suez Canal. This action could be
construed as posing a threat to safe shipping on the waterway
and hence, .justify British and French intervention (5: 492).
This plan provided the French and British the pretext they
needed to secure the canal. Also, it served two important pur-
poses for the Israelis; first, Israel would not be "out in the
cold" alone as an aggressor; second, Egyptian forces would be
compelled to deal with the British and French. This would lessen
the forces Israel would find in opposition.
Israeli intentions as set forth by Dayan were to create
a threat to the Suez Canal in accordance withour commitment in the plan, and then came the twobasic objectives of the campaign--the capture of theStraits of Tiran and the defeat of the Egyptianforces (2:234).
Dayan further noted that,
In the state of affairs that existed between Israel4 .and her neighbors, it was best to shed as little blood
as possible. I therefore established that our aimwas "to confound the military array of the Egyptian
K, forces and bring about their collapse." This meantthat our army was to seize the cross roads, dom-inating emplacements, and key fortlfications whichwould give us control of the area and thereby compelt e enemy to surrender (2t234).
'Dayan's strategy to achieve these objectives was daring
10
.7~
and engendered any-.number of heated confrontations with his sub-
ordinatetcommanders. Specifically,-the key points of his plan
.7 ywere: First, he ordered a battalion of paratroops to be air-
dropped near the Mitla Pass on the night of Oct 29, 1956. This
placed a powerful Israeli force in Egyptian territory within
thirty miles of the Suez Canal. Dayan's estimate was that this
airdrop would appear to the Egyptians as nothing more than a
retaliatory raid for terrorist attacks, and therefore, not cause
alarm to the Egyptians.
Second, Dayan delayed mobilization of the reserves until 72
hours prior to the mainforce attack. He let it be "leaked" that
. the mobilization was in preparation for action against Jordan
for providing a safe haven for terroristia Again, Dayan hoped
not to alarm the Egyptians. "TheDEgyptian military :reacted to this I'
first phase as I had expected," Dayan observed. "They simply did
* not exploit their advantage of massive superiority in Russian
arms and equipment and their much larger Air Forces equipped with
the latest Soviet jet fighter and bombers" (2-.238).
* Finally, twenty four hours after the paratroops had been
dropped, Dayan launched the main attack. It was a three pronged
invasion of the Sinai. One force attacked the major Egyptian
fortifications at Al-Quesseima and Abu-Aghoila. Another forces
* . in the south, attacked AX-Quintilla. Meanwhile, the final force
thrust passed the Gaza Strip# isolating it from reinforcements,
to Al-Arish on the coast.
To Dayan • the most important objective of this campaign
was the capture of Sharn-l-She ihk the heavily defended ci ty on
.. frs pas a ha epete,"Daanobered "he smpy id1"1
the southernmost point of the Sinai peninsula, from which the
Egyptians were blockading the Gulf of Aquaba to Israeli shipping
(2:255). Again, it was important that the Egyptians not recog-
nize his intentions and further reinforce the city. With such
intense action in the northern Sinai, the Egyptians paid scant
attention to reports from their outposts of an Israeli force
traveling along the northern shore of Aquaba to Sharm-el-Sheh..The Egyptians believed the desert in that area to be impassable
by anything other than the camel patrols they utilized. Neverthe-
less, the Israeli 9th Brigade was arduously making its way across
this "impassable" trail with over 200 armored vehicles. The
paratroop battalion, which had been dropped earlier was making
its way at full speed southward to Sharm-el-Sheihk.
Dayan considered speed and initiative paramount in employing
his forces. He assigned his forces independent axes of advance,
so each force could press forward as swiftly as the situation
allowed. He disdained the thought of a battalion being held up
waiting for another force to join it. Speed in advance and in
the mobilization were strategies not without their problems. On
several occasions Israeli armored units engaged each other and in-
flicted damase. Also, the Israeli Air Force, on one occasion, de-
stroyed a number of tanks fromi one of their own units. These a K- incidents occurred because the forces were assembled and employed
hastily. Perhaps, because of such incidents Dayan felt complled a
to explain at length the justification fie such haste (a204-206).
I. As Dayan explains, "The real military problem which faced
her (Israel's) army in Sinai was not how to overcome the Egyptian
12
forces, but how to do so within the restrictive political frame-
work..." (i.e. achieving her objectives before the Soviets
could obtain a UN cease fire resolution against Israel.)
Such misadventures and obstacles were inevitable onceeverything centered on speed--and speed was integralto the solution adopted by the Israeli Army to meetit* military and political problems (2:205).
Problems withstanding, Dayan's orchestration of the Sinai
Campaign was a:
brilliant application of the strategy of the indirectapproach. Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart, who coinedthis strategy, characterized the opening moves in theSinai as one of.the most brilliant applications ofsuch an approach in the history of warfare--he consi-dered the Sinai plan to have been a "work of art"(3:141).
Perhaps more significant in this campaign than his strategy
was Dayan's insistence on officer leadership. Dayan had insisted
that officers set the example and personally lead under fire (5:
479). This was done, and done fully and well, thus setting the
standard for future Israeli military actions (3:141).
13
V *1. I ,..,
Chapter Four
THE SIX DAY WAR
On the 22nd of May 1967, Nasser closed the Straits of Tiran
to Israeli shipping and, thus, set into motion the third Arab-
Israeli war. He called on the Arab states to join him in the
destruction of Israel. Within days, the Israelis found them-
selves encircled by the 250,000 troops, over 2,000 tanks and
more than 700 front line aircraft of the Arab nations (3:149).
The Israelis had mobilized their reserves but the then Prime
Minister Eshkol was unable to develop a consensus on what to do
next. With the reserves mobilized, the nations economy was at a
standstill and the tense populace was demanding decisive leader-
A . si J. p .
,, There developed across the country an outcry for Moshe
[A Dayan to return to governmer. as the Minister of Defense. Eshkol, A
desperate to restore confidence in his administration, took the
extraordinary step of co-opting Dayan, his political adversary,
into the government. Dayan accepted.
Dayan, in strongest terms, urged an inmmediate preemptive A
strike against Egypt (2:345). Dayan perceived that neither the ,
A UN nor the US would effectively come to Israel's aid and that * AY
waiting would only serve to allow the Arab countries to better
integrate and coordinate their forces.
14
On June 5, 1967, three days after Dayan assumed leadership
of the defense establishment, Israel launched a preemptive air-
strike against Egypt.
Dayan's plan, initially, was to neutralize the Egyptian
air force, destroy their ground forces in the Sinai and again ,
.* capture Sharm-El-Sheik. However, the Israeli plans and objectives
changed considerably as the war unfolded.
The preemptive airstrike was a stunning success. The
Israelis successfully evaded Egyptian radar and struck eleven
airfields simultaneously as the Egyptian commanders were enroute -to work. The Israelis destroyed 309 out of 340 serviceable
aircraft (3.152).
However, the Egyptians broadcast that they had destroyed
75% of the Israeli air force and urged the Syrians and Jordanians
to join in the attack against Israel. They did,. By mid-after-
noon the Israelis repeated their performance and destroyed all of
the Jordanian air force and two-thirds of the Syrian air force
,; for a total of 416 Arab aircraft. The Israelis lost only 26 air-
craft in the day's action (3s153).
With total control of the skies, the Israelis were free to
* deal with the ground forces on the three fronts. The Syrians
)imifed their action to shelling Israeli settlements from the
Golan Heights. The Jordanians crossed the Jerusalem armistice
lines and captured the United Nations headquarters on a hill over
looking the town. Dayan staged limited operations against thesethreats and focused his efforts on Egypt.
15
He feigned an attack in the northern Negev desert and
.L launched a three pronged assault at Egyptian strongholds in the
northern and central Sinai. Contrary to Egyptian expectations
that the Israelis would strike deep and bypass fortifications,
the Israelis attacked headlong. This drove Egyptian armour
from their strongholds near the Israeli border fleeing to the
:Mitla Pass near the Suez Canal. Unknown to the Egyptians, the
Israelis had blocked the pass and were laying in wait for the
Egyptian armor. With the Egyptian armor then out in the open
,,desert, the expert Israeli tankers and air force pursued them
relentlessly and unmercifully. All told, the Israelis destroyed
or captured more than eight hundred tanks in the Sinai.
Though Dayan had not intended it, his forces advanced to the
Suez Canal, Dayan did not want to become involved in the inter-
national ramifications of securing the canal. However when he
learned that his forces were there he ordered them to secure it.
Sharm-el-Sheikh fell with no resistance and all of Dayan's original
objectives had been secured in four days (5:649).
However, Dayan was receiving pressure from the government
to capture Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. Dayan did not favor
an assault on Jerusalem for fear of heavy casualties and damage
to the religious shrines. Furthermore, he was not enthusiasti"
about attacking the Golan lihts because the threat to Damascus
might bring Soviet intervention. le knew too, casualties would
be dreadful assaulting the well entrenched Syrians on the heavily
fortified Golan Heights.
.4Dayan stalled. He sent forces to capture the heightsi, :'16
surrounding Jerusalem which placed his forces in commanding
artillery position for the entire West Bank. His air force,
meanwhile, heavily strafed and bombarded the Jordanian brigades
on the West Bank. The Jordanian forces collapsed and Dayan
ordered the capture of Jerusalem with the restriction that there
be no air or artillery support to avoid damage to the cities
religious shrines. As expected the casualties were very heavy;
worse than in the battle for Sinai, but to the Israelis, access
to the religious shrines was worth it.
With the Egyptians and Jordanians neutralized, Dayan chose
next to deal with the most intransigent of the Arab countries--
Syria. However, mindful of the possibility of Soviet intervention,
he ordered action against only the area of the Syrian Golan Heights
from which Israel had been shelled. The Israelis attacked the
Golan Heights at its best fortified sector. The Israeli Chief
of Staff explained:
I chose a narrow frontal assault. It's the mostrisky . . . but its advantage is that if you dosucceed, you soon have your troops in the enemy'srear. This is very important where you're fightingArabs. Psychologically, they break easily (5%659).
The Golan Heights were a nightmare of foitifications ten
miles deep. The Israelis advanced according to plan with con-
tinious aerial bobardmant supporting them. For two days the
fighting raged with the Israelis incurring very heavy casualties.
"Few Arabs survived the onslaught. The Israelis were uninterested
in taking prisoners" (5s657). Finally, the Israelis penetrated
their sector and found that the Syrians had abandoned thdirOrt~fortifications.•.'
2*.,-
7 7 =77 77'- ''' --' - 777 ' .,:< , ,_, . : . :_.. ...., .. ..... - ;4 ... . ..A.m
I
Chapter Five
YOM KIPPUR WAR
In the Six Day War, Moshe Dayan instructed his forces not
to advance on the Suez Canal, for he was ever mindful of future
relations with his Arab neighbors. However, one of Dayan's
zealous field commanders seized a sector of the Suez Canal, and
much against his better judgement, Dayan acquiesced to political
pressure and seized the entire canal (2:465). Dayan believed
that as long as the Israelis held the Canal and denied the
Egyptians the opportunity to rehabilitate her cities, then
another war was inevitable. Since 1970 he had urged that the
Israelis withdraw from the Canal and reach an agreement of some
sort with the Egyptians (2:465). Dayan was not successful in
persuading his political leadership to support this idea.
Dayan, along with the senior political and military leader-
ship believed that the Egyptians would not initiate a war with
Israel until they were assured of air supremacy. This, it was
eatimated, would not occur until 1975. Thereforel though the
Arabs, had been deployed at full strength along Israel's borders
for two years as of fall 1973t Dayan felt that the undisputed
supremacy of Israel's Air VorcO would forestall an Arab attack.
Even against Arab forces that consisted of over one million
well-trained troops, over 1,000 first line Soviet fighters, over
777.
59000 of the newest Soviet tanks and a full array of anti-tank
and anti-aircraft missles, the Israeli's were, neverthelesss,
confident.
During the predawn hours on Yom Kippur, October 6, 1973,
Dayan was awakened and informed that reliable intelligence had
determined that the Egyptians would attack Israel at 4 o'clock
that afternoon (2:459). Dayan assured that the Prime Minister,
Golda Meir was notified and convened his staff. Dayan was con-
cerned over four issues (2:460). First, he ordered the limited
mobilization of reserves for defense. Seconds he disapproved a
preemptive airstrike against Syria. He ". . . feared such moves
. .would burden our prospects of securing the full support of the
United States" (2t461). Third, he ordered that Egypt and Syria
be warned through the United States not to attack. Fourth, he
ordered the immediate evacuation of women and children from the
frontier settlements in the Golan Heights.
Even with these actions taken, Dayan knew that it would take
24 to 48 hours to fully mobilize the reserves and get them to their
positions at the fronts. Therefore, he constantly monitored pro-
gress in implementing defense plans.
At 2.05 p.m. Dayan learned that the Egyptians and the Syrians
* had attacked Israel simultaneously. The Arab forces had staged
one of the outstanding plans of deception in the course of
military history" (3%316). Vor, as Dayan later admittedo ". 0
the Yo Kippur War broke over us on the very day we did not expect
it to" (2t473). Dayan also conceded that ". . . on this day, Egypt
and Syria had enjoyed two advantages of the highest importancot
19
*..~ .7T77JY71TT7777777-77777-
The initiative in starting the war, and preponderant superiority
of forces" (2:474).
By late that evening the Egyptians had crossed the Suez in
force. The Syrians had made a powerful drive into the Golan
Height". The Israeli Chief of Staff, General David Elazar, pre-
sented an optimistic appraisal of the situation to Prime Minister
Meir and her cabinet. Dayan, however, was deeply worried.
* 2. .I was haunted by the question of what had happened.H ad we erred in our basic planning or execution? Whathad happened to the three basic elements in our concept--the armour, the air force and the canal strongpointap,which werg supposed to confound any enemy attempt tocross the Canal. and inflict heavy damage (2t476)?
Dayan countered Elazar's appraisal on three points (2-.477).
First$ he said that these were not the Arab armies they had fought
in 1967. The soldiers were lavishly armed and well-trained.
Seconds the Arabs had extensive anti-aircraft systems, particu-
larly SAM G's, which would limit the effectiveness of the Israeli
Air F-orce. Third, he was concerned over Israel's lightly defended
* frontier and the time needed to mobilize-the population to defend
*Dayan recommended Lo the Prime Minister that the Israelis
withdraw from the Canal and retire to a aecond defensive line,
Dayant however, was alon&ein his assessnient. His reo~mwndation
to retire was not at all, well received~ His collegtaes could
not see the reality of their situation which. wou~ld become dread-* uly vident in the next five days (21477).
Israel's northe-rn fi ront, alongj the Syrian border, was the
-ron of firc Liting as ti00 Syrian tanks penetrated the
20
Golan Heights defended by 177 Israeli tanks. The Israelis in
the forth were properly deployed and were able to provide effective
,return fire against che Syrian forces. The sheer mass of the
Syrian forces overcame the Israeli defenses in one sector of the
Golan Heights and the Israeli defenses collapsed there. Dayan
was alarmed (2:481). Should the Syrians penetrate through the
Golan Heights and descend to the plains of Gallilee, Israeli
farming communities would be imperiled. Also, it would be extrem-
ly difficult to drive the invading forces out of Gallilee, once
- there. Dayan instructed his air force to conduct a continuous
attack, without relent, against the Syrian tanks.. Dayan then
phoned the Prime Minister and urged that Israel's shattered forces
by withdrawn frcm central Golan to a defensive line on the Jordan
Valley. "Appalled by Dayan's breaking nerve, the prime minister
said nothing, neither accepting nor rejecting the suggestion"
(5:758). For two more days,, the Israeli Air Force ceaselessly
attacked the Syrians as reservists were thrown into the defense
* effort. Israeli losses in aircraft to SAM's were very high in
providing close air support against the Syrians. Finally# on the
evening of October 9th the Syrian initiative broke and they began
retreating. They had lost some nine hundred tanks in the three
day battle.
In the final battle for the Golan, the Israelis were hit with
a "devastating artillery barrage, and a new force of 600 heavy
, tanks (5:7 58) . This powerful force virtually liquidated Israeli
forces in the north. Down to his last six tanks, the commander .,,j
. . . . . . . . .. . . . .. _ ..
A.
counterattacked and the Syrian forces began to withdraw (5:758).
Despite proper deployment and employment, the Israeli forcesin the north experienced heavy casualties; but in the end, with
the daring and skilled application of "flying artillery", they
I prevailed. In the Sinai, however, the Israeli's were neither
properly deployed nor employed initially. Specifically the
Israeli strongpoints along the Suez Canal were not reinforced
with armor as planned (2:453). These strongpoints were small
foritifications spread five miles apart along the Canal. In
peacetime they served as observation posts. In war, they were.
to 'be reinforced vith tanks to provide a wall of defensive fire-
power along the Canal. The commander on the southern front held
his tanks back six miles from the line of strongpoints, intending
to move them forward just prior to the attack. This was a dis-
astrous error (5:755), The Egyptians initiated their attack
before the tanks could be brought forward. Almost immediately the
strongpoints were surrounded by Egyptian infantry and armor
and received withering fire. As the Israeli armor dashed
forward, it too wa4 devastated by rocket propelled grenades an"efficient Soviet anti-tank Tidssi~s. In the first twenty-foar
hours of fighting the Egyptians had reduced Israeli armor forces
to a fraction of what they were at the onset (5:493). Dayan
. % flew back from the front and urged the prime minister to withdraw
to a defensive line away from the Canal (2:494). However, Elazar
, urged that reserve armor be brought against the Egyptians to
drivo them back across the Canal. Elazar prevailed, Dayan was
overruled. Dayan later recounted his thoughts at this moment.
22
"It seemed to me that the root difference between other members
of the government and myself lay in the degree of readiness to
face up to reality and recognize its implications" (2:455).
The next day's counterattack by the Israelis was a total
failure. The tank crews fought valiantly but the sheer mass of
rocket propelled grenades, anti-tank missiles and Sagger missiles
again devasted the, heretofore, invincible Israeli armour.
Dayan flew to the Sinai front that evening to meet with the
senior commander there:
I got there after midnight, feeling what must have beenmeant by the biblical "angry, even unto death." Afterthe war had come upon us as it did; after the first dayon the southern front when the forces were not deployedin their assigned positions at the proper time; afterthe strongholds had not been evacuated when there had Lstill been time to do so; now, when we had finally con-centrated a suitable force there--three armoured divi-sions and scores of aircraft--which had battled a wholeday, that too had been wasted, frittered away, all fornothing (2:499).
Dayan returned and met with the prime minister to secure her
approval on his plan of action (2t500). He was now successful.
First, Israeli forces would cross the Suez Canal and attack the
Egyptian missile emplacements and attack the Egyptian rear area.
Second, the commander of the southern front would be relieved
immediately. Third, Dayan would issue a no retreat order to
forces on the northern front; they could expect no reinforcement.
Fourth, Dayan directed the air force to attack military targets
in the Damascus area in retaliation for the Syrian employment of
Soviet ground to ground missiles against civilian population
centers. Fifth, the prime minister would leave immediately for
23
a secret meeting with President Nixon, to secure US support.
The Israeli forces began their bloody drive to the Suez.
Now, however, they incorporated new hard-learned tactics. Dayan
observed that "in the absence of immediate technological solutions
to the problems posed by these new weapon systems, the answer
had to be found in the sphere of battle tactics. . ." (2:507)., .,
Specifically, the Israelis found that enemy troops using RPC
rockets and Sagger missiles gave away their position through the
missile smoke trail. Thus, with the skillful use of infantry
along with tanks, and using the tanks more as !snipers" and not
Las "galloping calvary" it was possible to neutralize or, at least,
avoid the devastation of these weapons. SAM batteries were another
matter, in Dayan's view. "I do not think an Air Force can over-
come them completely, and aircraft therefore cannot give close
and effective support to ground forces in an area covered by such
anti-aircraft missiles" (2:508).
The Israelis employed these new tactics which, with respect
to airpower, translated to keeping their aircraft away from
missile batteries. Instead, they drew Egyptian forces out away
from the protective umbrella of their missile batteries and un- -
mercifully destroyed them with their expert tank and aircraft
fire.
L With tliese:tactics, .the Israelis succeeded in driving the
Syrians vell beyond the Golan Heights and in placing a powerful
* force on the west bank of the Suez Canal, thus trapping the
Egyptian Third Army, by the time a UN cease fire was declared. -
24
,+ Though the Israelis had erred initially, and paid dearly for it,
-they were able to formulate new strategies and tactics to turn
the course of the war in their favor.
f. ;7
• • I . J +
: a
Chapter Six
MOSHE DAYAN AND THE STRATEGY PROCESS
For nearly thirty years Moshe Dayan was a dominant figure
in Israel's military and political life. As such he exercised
considerable influence in articulating his nations objectives
and determining its military, political and economic strategies.
His military strategy and tactics were consciously developed with
a keen eye on the political and economic environment in which his
country operated. Key elements in this environment were: Israel,
itself as a small developing nation, the Arabs, the Soviets, the
United States and the United Nations.Israel needed peace. The country needed peace to develop
its land, its economy and to absorb vast numbers of diverse
immigrants into its society. Save survival, Israel has derived
no benefit to development in diverting resources to military pre-
paredness and war. These, in fact, have proved to be a crushing
burden for the country. For example, Israel expended one year' s
GNP in the eighteen day Yom Kippur War. Therefore, foremost in
:4 Dayan's mind was the political objective of peace with the Arabs.
*, i. , Even in the midst of war he was ever mindful of the consequences .
* of Israel's actions on subsequent political relations with the
Arabs.
Because of this, he sought to minimize the Arab incentive to
26
* go to war, and provide disincentives where possible. Dayan
insisted upon avoiding casualties amongst the Arab civilians.
As a result, there have been remarkably few instances of Israeli
atrocities. Dayan balked at acquiring Arab territory. It will
be recalled in the Six Day War, Dayan did not want to seize the
Suez Canal, Old Jerusalem or the Golan Heights. He believed,
and time proved him correct, that conquering Arab lands, par-
ticularly the Sinaiwould inevitably lead to another war. The
Egyptian incentive to attack was too great to be dissuaded.This, then, dictated a military objective of a swift, deci-
sive war in which the Arab capability to wage war was destroyed,
but with emphasis on destroying military hardware and fortifica-
tions--not people. There were, also, other reasons for Dayan's
pursuit of a swift strategy. First, with a population of only
three million, Israel could not cope with wars of attrition
against its populous neighbors. Second, the Israeli's could not
provide the manpower for a large standing army. They relied
heavily on reservists. Mobilizing these reservists brought their
economy to a standstill. Therefore, Israel simply could not
fight a war more than a few weeks in length. V
One major constraint on Dayan's strategy was the Soviet
> Union. He had to conduct decisive campaigns to achieve peace,
* but not so decisive as to bring the Soviet Union directly into
-war with Israel. The Soviets, Dayan perceived, would not tolerate
the total humiliation of their client states at the hands of
Israel. In every Arab-Israeli war since the 1956 Suez Campaign,
, pointblank Soviet threats of direct intervention weighed heavily
27
on Dayan's decision making.
An important (probably the most important) constraint facing
Dayan was the United States. Israel could not survive without
the economic, political and military support of the United
States. Israel needed arms and aid from the United States. More
than once, the threat of US intervention held the Soviets at bay
during the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War. It was important,
therefore, that Israel convince Washington that it had done every-
thing possible to avoid war. For this reason, Dayan automatically
ruled out a preemptive airstrike on the eve of the Yom Kippur War.
From 1948 on, the Arabs were very effective in using the
United Nations against Israel. Whenever it became apparent to
the Arabs that they were losing the war with the Israelis they
would appeal, through the Soviets, to the UN for a ceasefire
resolution. Since Israel could not afford to ignore such a : ~resolution, the Israelis were compelled to move very swiftly be-
fore a ceasefire to achieve military objectives which would enhance
their negotiating position afterwards.
These objectives and constraints directly guided Dayan's
development, deployment and employment of his forces. However,
there can be no doubt that Dayan's personality also shaped each
of these elements of his strategy (5s479, 4%229). Specifically,
Dayan forged a military force that emphasized swift striking
power. Hin emphasis in force structure was on armor and air-
power. He insisted on extensive training for professional and
reserve forces. To offset Israel's inability to man or support
a large standing army, he developed a largely reserve force which
28
was capable of rapid mobilization. He built the army into the
mirror image of himself. NCO's and officers, alike, were promoted
from the ranks. All ranks were trained to think and take the
initiative themselves. Dayan actively discouraged military de-
corum. As S.L.A. Marshall described him, "He is the natural man,
utterly without side, forthright in speech and in his personal
manner, almost a homespun character" (4:228). Dayan's own biog-.
rah i epeewihreeeces to the "fighting spirit" of
Israel's armed forces. His bitterest criticisms are of those
commanders and units which did not display "fighting spirit" in
combat. Clearly* more than anything else* Dayan sought striking
power and "fighting spirit" in developing his forces.
Dayan's force deployment strategy was shaped by the realities
of Israel's situation. Though Arab forces often remained de-
ployed at full strength along Israel's borders for long periods
of time, Dayan could not afford to mobilize the reserves. There-
fore.. Dayan placed his small standing army on defensive positions
along the frontier, and relied upon intelligence to provide in-
sight into Arab intentions. This strategy placed extraordinary
importance on accurate early warning of an Arab attack plan to
*permit sufficient time to mobilize Israel's reserves. This de-
ployment plan was not without its perils as the Yom Kippur War
has shown.
In employin his forces, Dayan emphasized the principles of
offensive, surprise and maneuver. In war, he struck swiftly at
* the time and place of his choosing. To that end, his forces
relied almost solely on swift armor and air power. He employed
29
7* -7
little supporting infantry or artillery for these arms do not
possess the swiftness necessary in Dayan's form of attack. His
use of maneuver was best exemplified by his tactic of providing
each ground force a separate axis of attack. Each commander,
therefore, was free to exploit the battlefield situation as he
saw fit. This tactic exploited the Arab's greatest weakness-
their inability to depart from plans and seize the initiative.
Dayan and his commanders exploited this characteristic of the Arab
armies more than any other.
Dayan's strategy and tactics served Israel better at some
times than at others. In the final analysis, though, the acid
test for strategy is how well it achieves national objectives.
Israel has survived and prospered against considerable odds. it
has not been overrun by the Arabs, invaded by the Soviets nor
abandoned by the United States. Dayan served his country well.
" •0.4
- 44-- ,4- .'- ;.
I L - .,.
____________BIBLIOGRAPHY________
A. REFERENCES CITED
1. Dayan, Moshe. Diary of the Sinai Campaign. New York: Harperand Row, 1965.
2. Dayans Moshe. The Story of My Life. New Yorks WilliamMorrow and Company, 1976.
3. Herzog# Chaim. The Arab-Israeli Wars. New Yorks RandomHouse# 1982.
4. Marshall, S.L.A. Sinai Victory. New York: William Morrow$
5. Sachars Howard. A Hitory of Israel* New York. Alfred A.Knopf Inc., 1976.
B. RELATED SOURCES
Dayan, Moshe. Breaktrough,# Now Yorks Alfred A. Knopf* 1981.
Gervasip Frank. Thunder Over tho Mediterranean. New YorksDavid McKay cTiCo. WE.1195-
* Ooldschmidtp J,. Arthr. A Con-ise. History oE the Middle East.Boulder# Colo-t Westvlil resa, 1979.
Teveth, Shabtai * Mosho-Dayan * Bostis, Houghton Mif bin Comanry#1973.
____ ___ ____ ___APPENDIX _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
KEY EVENTS IN MOSHE DAYAN 'S LIFE
* 1915 Born in Deganiahs Palestine
1929 Joined Jewish Underground
1941 Lost lef., eye in action in Syria
1948 Assumed Command of 89th Battalion
1949 Promoted to Major General
1953 Appointed Chief of Staff
1959 Appointed Minister of Agriculture
1967 Appointed Minister of Defense
32